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Analysis of The Hindu Editorial 1 : All eyes on Baku and the climate finance goal
Context
As the world grapples with the effects of climate change—largely felt by nations that contributed least to the problem—the global spotlight turns to the upcoming climate finance negotiations. The question on everyone’s mind is: will these discussions lead to real, actionable outcomes, or will they merely offer more empty promises?
Introduction
At the heart of the upcoming COP29 conference in Baku, Azerbaijan, is the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance. Set to be a defining feature of this conference, the NCQG seeks to address the financial needs and priorities of developing countries, as outlined in Article 9 of the Paris Agreement. Scheduled from November 11 to 22, 2024, COP29, also dubbed the “finance COP,” will determine the trajectory of climate finance for the years to come.
Ongoing Debates and Challenges
Diverging Perspectives
The road to consensus on the NCQG is fraught with differing opinions, as was evident in the high-level ministerial discussions leading up to COP29. Key areas of contention include the overall structure and scope of the goal, financial contributions, timelines, and funding sources.
- Developing Countries’ Standpoint: Developing nations are pushing for clear, quantitative targets that prioritize public finance, grants, and concessional loans. They emphasize that the financial burden should not fall disproportionately on them and call for equity in climate finance, balancing both adaptation and mitigation efforts.
- Developed Countries’ Position: On the other hand, developed nations advocate for a more inclusive approach, calling for an expanded contributor base. Their focus is on outcome-driven strategies targeting low emissions and climate resilience, with an emphasis on flexible financing mechanisms.
The $100 Billion Climate Finance Pledge
One of the most contentious issues remains the failure of developed countries to meet the $100 billion annual climate finance pledge, made in 2009 and extended to 2025. While the target was finally met in 2022, trust has been eroded, especially given that the needs of developing countries far exceed this amount. Estimates suggest that climate action costs could reach $5 to $7 trillion, highlighting the insufficiency of the current financing framework.
The Reality Behind the Pledge
Although the OECD reported that developed countries mobilized $115.9 billion in 2022, significant challenges persist. The majority of this funding has come in the form of loans rather than grants, further indebting vulnerable countries. There is also a significant shortfall in adaptation funding, with most investments funneled into mitigation projects like clean energy, leaving critical adaptation needs, such as infrastructure resilience, underfunded.
Expanding the Contributor Base
Equity Concerns
Discussions around expanding the contributor base to include countries with high emissions and strong economies—such as China and oil-rich nations—raise questions of fairness. While some, like Switzerland and Canada, have proposed expanding the base to reflect shifts in global economic power, developing countries see this as a potential move to sidestep the equity and common but differentiated responsibilities principles enshrined in the Paris Agreement.
Risk of Stalled Progress
This debate, which first surfaced during the Paris Agreement talks, threatens to derail crucial negotiations at COP29. By broadening the contributor base, there is a risk of diluting accountability, shifting the burden from historically responsible nations, and stalling urgently needed climate action.
Climate Finance Commitments: What’s at Stake?
Adherence to Article 9
The foundation of the NCQG and any climate finance commitments should remain aligned with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, which calls for a balance between adaptation and mitigation funding. Importantly, public and grant-based finance must be at the core of climate funding, especially for adaptation, to prevent further debt accumulation for developing countries.
The Narrative Shift by Developed Countries
However, developed nations appear to be reframing their narrative towards “low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.” This shift has significant implications, as it may dilute their legal obligations under the Paris Agreement, moving away from the original intent of climate finance.
The Updated Definition of Climate Finance
The Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) has provided an updated operational definition of climate finance, focusing on reducing emissions, enhancing adaptive capacities, and building resilience in human and ecological systems. However, a critical omission in this updated definition is the concept of additionality—the idea that climate finance should be new and incremental support, not simply repurposed from existing funds.
Private Investment vs. Public Finance
While private investment is valuable for certain sectors like clean energy, it often falls short in addressing adaptation needs. Moreover, counting private investments towards climate finance commitments risks undermining the accountability and purpose of these funds, which should prioritize the public good over profit-driven outcomes.
The Path Forward: Key Considerations for NCQG
As the NCQG negotiations continue, the following must be prioritized to ensure climate finance meets the real needs of developing countries:
- Equitable Financing: Public, grants-based funding should be at the heart of climate finance, particularly for adaptation projects.
- Technology Transfer and Capacity Building: Developing nations not only require financial support but also access to technology and the means to build capacity for both adaptation and mitigation.
- Streamlined Access to Funds: Procedural barriers within multilateral financial mechanisms must be addressed to ensure developing countries can access the resources they need.
Conclusion
The success of COP29 and the NCQG hinges on whether these negotiations restore trust between developed and developing nations. Without a firm commitment to equity, historical responsibility, and capacity building, the divide between the Global North and South will only widen. As the world prepares to gather in Baku, the key question remains: will these discussions lead to meaningful climate finance solutions, or will they be yet another round of unmet promises?
Analysis of The Hindu Editorial 2 : India, Pakistan and modifying the Indus Waters Treaty
Context
With trust at a low point between India and Pakistan, efforts to renegotiate the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) and make necessary modifications face significant challenges. This raises critical questions about the future of water management between these two countries, especially in light of changing environmental and geopolitical conditions.
Introduction
On August 30, 2024, India formally notified Pakistan of its intention to review and amend the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), under Article XII (3) of the treaty. This move is driven by India’s concerns about meeting its growing domestic water demands, especially in the context of population growth, increased agricultural needs, and the urgent push for clean energy to fulfill its climate commitments.
In its notice, India also highlighted that ongoing cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir is obstructing the smooth implementation of the treaty, making it difficult for the country to fully utilize its rights over the Indus waters.
Article XII allows for modifications to the treaty but sets a high bar, requiring a “duly ratified treaty concluded between both governments.” Given the long-standing tension between the two nations, achieving a mutually agreeable revision seems unlikely, as past attempts have shown during the 2013 Kishanganga arbitration.
Divergent Approaches to the Treaty
India’s Perspective as the Upper Riparian
India, being the upper riparian country, focuses on making the most efficient use of its water resources under the IWT. For India, the treaty’s primary purpose is to ensure the optimal utilization of the waters flowing from the rivers within its control.
Pakistan’s View as the Lower Riparian
In contrast, Pakistan, as the lower riparian nation, is primarily concerned with ensuring uninterrupted flow of water from the rivers that flow into its territory. This difference in perspective leads to frequent disputes, as both countries interpret the treaty’s provisions in ways that favor their respective positions.
Claims and Counterclaims
The diverging interpretations of the treaty’s purpose have resulted in multiple claims and counterclaims. For example, in 2013, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague ruled in India’s favor, allowing it to build hydropower projects on the Kishanganga River. However, the court also imposed a condition that India must maintain a minimum flow of nine cubic meters per second to protect downstream water access for Pakistan.
India has ambitious plans to build 33 hydropower projects along the western tributaries of the Indus. While the treaty allows for hydroelectric power generation, Pakistan remains concerned about whether India will maintain sufficient water flow to its territory.
Challenges in Water Resource Management
Optimizing Utilization and Maintaining Minimum Flow
Achieving the dual goals of optimizing water use and maintaining minimum flow rates requires improved management across the entire Indus Basin. Unfortunately, the current structure of the IWT, which divides the basin into eastern and western rivers, presents significant hurdles.
- India’s Rights: According to Article II, India holds exclusive rights over the eastern rivers—the Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas.
- Pakistan’s Rights: Article III grants Pakistan proprietary rights over the western rivers—the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab.
This division, which was born out of the political realities following Partition, has made it difficult to achieve integrated water resource management. Instead of fostering cooperation, it has led to minimal coordination between the two countries.
Historical Context: A Fragmented Basin
The partitioning of the Indus River system, driven by political necessity, essentially severed the natural hydrological relationships between these rivers and their tributaries. This has made integrated water resource management almost impossible, and has led to disputes over how the waters should be shared and utilized.
The Role of International Law and the “No Harm” Rule
No Harm Rule in Customary International Law
Although the Indus Waters Treaty does not explicitly mention the no harm rule, both India and Pakistan are bound by it under customary international law. This rule imposes a duty on both countries to ensure that any project they undertake on shared watercourses does not cause significant harm to the other.
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA)
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its 2010 ruling on the Pulp Mills case, identified transboundary environmental impact assessments (EIA) as a critical component of international law. This ruling effectively requires India and Pakistan to conduct EIAs for any projects that could potentially have cross-border effects. However, the ICJ did not specify the exact criteria for these assessments, leaving room for interpretation.
Equitable and Reasonable Utilization (ERU) of Watercourses
The UN Watercourses Convention
The principle of Equitable and Reasonable Utilization (ERU), outlined in Articles 5 and 6 of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, provides guidance for managing international watercourses. This principle can help both India and Pakistan address unforeseen circumstances, such as those arising from climate change.
Climate Change and Water Depletion
One of the most pressing challenges both nations face is the impact of climate change, which is already leading to the depletion of glaciers in the region. Scientists predict that glacial melt could reduce the flow of the Indus by 30-40%, posing a severe threat to water security in both countries.
Opportunities for Joint Projects
Article VII.1(c) of the IWT provides an opportunity for cooperation on joint engineering projects along the river. If both countries agree to work together, joint projects could help mitigate the effects of climate change and improve water management in the region.
Conclusion: A Path Forward
Renegotiating the Indus Waters Treaty will undoubtedly be a challenging task, given the deep mistrust between India and Pakistan. However, instead of focusing solely on a complete overhaul of the treaty, both countries could explore using the existing negotiation mechanisms to create memorandums of understanding (MoUs) or other cooperative frameworks to address emerging issues. This approach could allow them to develop the Indus Basin in a way that benefits both parties, without compromising the core structure of the treaty.
Effective management and cooperation remain the keys to resolving water disputes between India and Pakistan. With the right mix of diplomacy and technical collaboration, the two nations could find a way forward, ensuring sustainable water management for future generations.